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Abstract
Scoring rules are an important tool for evaluating the performance of
probabilistic forecasting schemes. In the binary case, scoring rules (which
are strictly proper) allow for a decomposition into terms related to the
resolution and to the reliability of the forecast. This fact is particularly
well known for the Brier Score. In this paper, this result is extended
to forecasts for finite–valued targets. Both resolution and reliability are
shown to have a positive effect on the score. It is demonstrated that
resolution and reliability are directly related to forecast attributes which
are desirable on grounds independent of the notion of scores. This find-
ing can be considered an epistemological justification of measuring fore-
cast quality by proper scores. A link is provided to the original work
of DeGroot and Fienberg (1982), extending their concepts of sufficiency
and refinement. The relation to the conjectured sharpness principle of
Gneiting et al. (2005a) is elucidated.
1 Introduction
Brown (1970) argues that it seems reasonable to value forecasts (be they proba-
bilistic or other) by a scheme related to the extend to which the forecasts “come
true”. Scoring rules provide examples for such schemes in the case of proba-
bilistic forecasts. After pioneering work by Good (1952); Brier (1950), scores
were thoroughly investigated in the 1960’s and 1970’s. The score was effectively
thought of as a reward system, inducing (human) experts to provide their judg-
ments or predictions regarding uncertain events in terms of probabilities (Brown,
1970; Savage, 1971). In this respect, scoring rules were devices to elicit prob-
abilities from humans. The importance of using proper scores was recognized
∗email: broecker@pks.mpg.de
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already by Brier (1950) (see also Brown, 1970, for an entertaining discussion
and “some horrible examples”). The central argument is that a forecaster’s
probability assignment should be independent of the particular reward system,
which is guaranteed if the reward system constitutes a proper score. Savage
(1971) (following de Finetti, 1970) points out that this universality property
allows for an alternative definition of subjective probability, which is a concept
of probability independent of the notion of relative observed frequency.
Owing to the enormous increase in computer power over the last decades,
it became computationally feasible to numerically produce probabilistic fore-
casts for dynamical processes, employing models of ever increasing complex-
ity. Since it is obviously irrelevant whether probabilities are produced by hu-
mans or machines, scores provide a tool to evaluate probabilistic numerical
forecasting systems, too. In weather forecasting, scores had already been used
to evaluate subjective forecasts (issued by expert meteorologists), for example
of rain, long before numerical weather forecasts became available (Brier, 1950;
Winkler and Murphy, 1968; Epstein, 1969; Murphy and Winkler, 1977). Nowa-
days, scores are widely applied also in the evaluation of numerically generated
probabilistic weather forecasts (Gneiting et al., 2005b; Gneiting and Raftery,
2007; Bro¨cker et al., 2004; Raftery et al., 2005; Wilks, 2006a; Bro¨cker and Smith,
2008).
In contrast to the expert–judgment–forecasts considered in earlier works on
scores, weather forecasts are often issued over a long period of time under (more
or less) stationary conditions, allowing for archives of forecast–observation pairs
to be collected. This fact allows to reconsider the interpretation of probabil-
ities as long time observed frequencies. If we were to forecast the probabil-
ity of rain on a large number of occasions, we would like rain to occur on
a fraction p of those instances where our forecast was (exactly or around) p.
A forecast having this property (up to statistical fluctuations) is called reli-
able (Murphy and Winkler, 1977; Toth et al., 2003; Wilks, 2006b). If a large
archive of forecast–observation pairs is available, reliability becomes a sensible
property to ask for. As has been widely noted previously though, it is not dif-
ficult to produce reliable forecasts if no constraint is put on the information
content or resolution of the forecast (the exact meaning of these terms is often
left vague, though). In any event, the grand probability (aka climatological
frequency) of the target will always be a reliable forecast, and despite the dif-
ficulties with the term “information content”, many people would presumably
agree that this forecast is not very informative.
But how do these virtuous forecast attributes pertain to proper scores? Do
proper scores reward reliable forecasts? Does a “better informed” forecaster
really achieve a better score? In this paper, these questions are answered in the
affirmative (using the appropriate formalisation of “better informed”). In Sec-
tion 2, after recalling the notion of reliability, it is shown that proper scores allow
for a decomposition into terms measuring the resolution and the reliability of
the forecast. In particular, reliability turns out to have a direct positive impact
on the score. In Section 3, the concept of sufficiency is introduced, generalising
similar notions of DeGroot and Fienberg (1982). Sufficiency formalises the idea
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of “being more informed”, and is shown to have a direct positive impact on the
resolution term of the score.
The decomposition of Section 2 is well known for the Brier score (see for ex-
ample Murphy and Winkler, 1987; Murphy, 1996; Blattenberger and Lad, 1985),
a widely used score for forecasting problems with only two categories. The Brier
score presumably owes much of its popularity to this decomposition, rendering
its interpretation very clear. DeGroot and Fienberg (1982) have derived a simi-
lar decomposition for any proper score in the case of binary targets. (This result
seems not to be widely known in the atmospheric sciences community, and I be-
came aware of it rather belatedly during the preparation of this manuscript.)
The relation to the conjectured sharpness principle of Gneiting et al. (2005a) is
elucidated. The appendix contains several more technical points. Appendix A
provides an equivalent characterisation of reliability. In Appendix B, the equiv-
alence between sufficiency according to DeGroot and Fienberg (1982) and as
used in this paper is shown. Finally, the derivation of the decomposition (15) is
presented in Appendix C.
2 A general decomposition
In this section, a general decomposition of proper scores will be derived. To
facilitate the discussion, some convenient notation will be introduced first, sup-
plemented with a brief reminder on proper scores. Let Y denote the quantity
to be forecast, commonly referred to as the observation or target.1 The ob-
servation Y is modelled here as a random variable taking values in a set E.
For the sake of simplicity, E is assumed to be a finite set of alternatives (e.g.
“rain/hail/snow/sunshine”), labelled 1 . . .K. Values of Y (i.e. elements of E)
will be denoted by small lowercase letters like x, y, or z. A probability as-
signment over E is a K–dimensional vector p with nonnegative entries so that∑
k∈E pk = 1. The set of all probability assignments over E is denoted by PE .
Elements of PE will be denoted by p, q, and r. A probabilistic forecasting scheme
is a random variable γ with values in PE . In other words, the realisations of γ
are probability assignments over E. The reason for assuming γ to be random is
that forecasting schemes usually process information that will become available
before and at forecast time. For example, if γ is a weather forecasting scheme
with lead time 48h, it will depend on weather information down to 48h prior
to when the observation Y obtains. The task of designing a forecasting scheme
is effectively to model the relationship between this side information and what
is to be forecasted (see Murphy and Winkler, 1987; Murphy, 1993, 1996, for a
related discussion).2
It was already mentioned what reliability means in case that E contains
only two elements (1 and 0, say). In the case of more than two alternatives,
this definition of reliability generalises as follows: On the condition that the
1I use italics to indicate that an expression is to be considered a technical term.
2I do not consider forecasting problems which are explicitly dependent on time, for example
to take into account seasonal effects.
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forecasting scheme is equal to, say, the probability assignment p, the observation
Y should be distributed according to p, or in formulae
P (Y = k|γ = p) = pk (1)
for all k ∈ E. In particular, a reliable forecasting scheme can be written as a
conditional probability. As is demonstrated in Appendix A, the reverse is also
true: every conditional probability of Y is reliable. In view of Equation (1), I will
fix the notation piγk := P (Y = k|γ) , k = 1 . . .K for the conditional probability of
the observation given the forecasting scheme. Like every conditional probability,
piγ is a random quantity. Hence, piγ is a probabilistic forecasting scheme like γ
itself. In terms of piγ and γ, the reliability condition (1) can be written simply
as piγ = γ. Since piγ is reliable, it trivially holds that piγ = pi(pi
γ). In any case,
piγ is a function of γ, independent of whether γ is reliable or not.
Let us turn our attention to scoring rules (see for example Matheson and Winkler,
1976; Gneiting and Raftery, 2007). A scoring rule is a function S(p, y) which
takes a probability assignment over E as its first argument and an element of
E as its second argument. For any two probability assignments p and q, the
scoring function is defined as
s(p, q) =
∑
k∈E
S(p, k)qk. (2)
The interpretation of the scoring function is that if Z is a random variable of
distribution q, then s(p, q) is the mathematical expectation of the score of the
assignment p in forecasting Z. It is our convention that a small score indicates
a good forecast. A score is called proper if the divergence
d(p, q) = s(p, q)− s(q, q) (3)
is nonnegative, and it is called strictly proper if d(p, q) = 0 implies p = q.
The interpretation of d(p, q) as a divergence is obviously meaningful only if the
scoring rule is strictly proper. From now on, I assume that scoring rules are
strictly proper. It is important to note that d(p, q) is, in general, not a metric,
as it is neither symmetric nor does it fulfil the triangle inequality. The quantity
e(p) = s(p, p) (4)
is called the entropy of p.3 Table 1 gives a couple of frequently used scoring
rules along with the corresponding divergences and entropies.
Table 1 on top of this or the next page
For strictly proper scores,
e(p) = inf
q
s(q, p). (5)
3Gneiting and Raftery (2007) refer to −e(p) as either the generalised entropy function or
the information measure, but since entropy is commonly interpreted as a lack of information,
I define e(p) to be the entropy.
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Name scoring rule S(p, y) divergence d(q, p) entropy e(p)
Briera |y − p|2 |p− q|2 p(1− p)
Ignoranceb − log py
P
− log
“
pk
qk
”
qk
P
− log(pk)pk
CRPSc
R
(F (z)−H(y − z))2dz
R
(F (z)−G(z))2dz
R
F (z)(1− F (z))dz
PSSd −
pα−1y
‖p‖α−1α
‖q‖α −
〈q,p(z)α−1〉
‖p‖α−1α
−‖p‖α
PLSe
P
p2k − 2py
P
(pk − qk)
2 −
P
p2k
aFor binary cases (i.e. E = {0, 1}).
bPropriety follows from Jensen’s inequality.
cContinuous Ranked Probability Score – Here F and G are the cumulative distribution
functions corresponding to p and q, respectively.
dPseudo-spherical Scores – Here α > 1, while ‖p‖α =
ˆP
pαk
˜1/α
. Propriety follows from
Ho¨lder’s Inequality.
eProper Linear Score, also referred to as the quadratic score. For binary cases (i.e. E =
{0, 1}), this score is equivalent to the Brier score
Table 1: Scoring rule, divergence, and entropy for several common scores.
All sums extend over E. See Epstein (1969); Murphy (1971) for a dis-
cussion of the Ranked Probability Score. Matheson and Winkler (1976);
Gneiting and Raftery (2007) discuss scoring rules for continuous variables.
Since s(q, p) is linear in p, Equation (5) demonstrates that for strictly proper
scores, the entropy e(p) is an infimum over linear functions and hence con-
cave (Rockafellar, 1970). For the particular cases listed in Table 1, it should be
fairly obvious that the entropy is a measure for the uncertainty inherent in a
probability assignment p. For the Brier score and the Ignorance, the entropy is
indeed a very common measure of inherent randomness of a distribution. Fur-
thermore, suppose p and q are two probability assignments featuring the same
entropy, then intuitively, any mixture of p and q should have a larger inher-
ent uncertainty than any of the individual probability assignments, an intuition
which the entropy supports, due to the concavity of e(p).
Our aim now is to derive a decomposition of the expected score E [S(γ, Y )]
of the forecasting scheme γ. Since γ is random, the expectation affects both γ
and Y . An elementary property of the mathematical expectation gives
E [S(γ, Y )] = E [E [S(γ, Y )|γ]] . (6)
To calculate the conditional expectation E [S(γ, Y )|γ], the probability of Y given
γ is needed, but this is just piγ , whence
E [S(γ, Y )|γ] = s(γ, piγ). (7)
Substituting with Equation (7) in (6) results in
E [S(γ, Y )] = E s(γ, piγ). (8)
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From Equations (3) and (4) we get
s(γ, piγ) = e(piγ) + d(γ, piγ). (9)
Taking the expectation on both sides of Equation (9) and substituting for the
right hand side in (8), we obtain
E [S(γ, Y )] = E e(piγ) + E d(γ, piγ). (10)
The first term in Equation (10), the average entropy of piγ , can be decomposed
further. Consider the (nonrandom) assignment obtained by taking the average
of piγ ,
p¯i := Epiγ (11)
It is easily seen that p¯i is just the unconditional probability of Y , which in
meteorology is often referred to as the climatology of Y . Since s(p¯i, piγ) is linear
in piγ and p¯i is not random, it follows immediately from Equation (11) that
E s(p¯i, piγ) = s(p¯i, p¯i) = e(p¯i). (12)
Adding and subtracting E s(p¯i, piγ) on the right hand side of Equation (10) and
using Equation (12) we arrive at
E s(γ, y) = e(p¯i)− E d(p¯i, piγ) + E d(γ, piγ). (13)
Equation (13) constitutes the desired decomposition of the expected score of
the probabilistic forecasting scheme γ. This decomposition is, as I will argue,
completely analogous to and a generalisation of the well known decomposition
of the Brier score. The three terms in Equation (13) will be (from left to right)
referred to as the uncertainty of Y , the resolution term4, and the reliability term.
As a starting point for the discussion of the decomposition (13), the reader might
want to convince himself (with the help of Table 1) that for the Brier score,
Equation (13) indeed yields the known decomposition. Firstly, the uncertainty
of Y is the entropy of the climatology and hence can be interpreted as the
expected score of the climatology as a forecast, quantifying the ability of the
climatology to forecast random draws from itself. The resolution term E d(p¯i, piγ)
contributes negatively to the score. Note that due to the strict propriety of
the score, the resolution is always positive definite. Since the resolution term
describes the average deviation of piγ from its average p¯i (see Equation 11), it can
be interpreted as a form of variance of piγ . The larger the variance, the better
the score. This term reduces to the standard variance of piγ in case of the Brier
score. Finally, the reliability term (which is again positive definite) describes
the average deviation of γ from piγ . Recalling that γ = piγ indicates a reliable
forecast, the interpretation of the reliability term as the average violation of
reliability becomes obvious.
4Also called sharpness term
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3 A decomposition of the resolution term
The decomposition (13) demonstrates how the score changes if the forecast
scheme γ changes, but so that piγ remains constant. In this case, any deviation
of γ from piγ has adverse effects on the score. But in general, changing γ
means that piγ changes, too. Thus, changes γ usually entail changes in both the
reliability and the resolution term of the decomposition (13). The changes in
the resolution term are investigated in this section. The intuitive interpretation
of the resolution term is that it somehow measures the average information
content of the forecast scheme. In this section, I will discuss the concept of
forecast sufficiency, introduced by DeGroot and Fienberg (1982). This concept
formalises the notion of being “more or less informed” and allows for the partial
ordering of forecasting schemes. As will be seen in this section, γ1 will have at
least the same resolution as γ2 if γ1 if sufficient for γ2. Thus, the expected score
reproduces the same ordering as sufficiency. This result establishes a connection
between a quantitative notion of information as provided by the score, and a
qualitative notion of information contents as provided by sufficiency. This is
analogous to the relation between the reliability term of the decomposition (13)
and the qualitative reliability condition (1).
I call a forecasting scheme γ1 sufficient for a forecasting scheme γ2 if
pi2 = E
[
pi1|γ2
]
, (14)
where the abbreviations pi1 := piγ1 = P (Y |γ1) and analogously for pi
2 were used.5
In Appendix B, it is shown that the present notion of sufficiency is equivalent
to the corresponding definition of DeGroot and Fienberg (1982). Before con-
tinuing with score decompositions, let me try to elucidate the rather technical
condition (14) with a somewhat informal interpretation. Suppose the forecaster
who is running forecasting scheme γ1, albeit having no access to the current
value of γ2, collected a large archive of past values of γ2 and hence is able to
fit a good approximation to P (γ2|γ1). With this information, he tries to mimic
forecasting scheme γ2 as follows. The forecaster’s mimicry version of γ2 (which
we denote by γ∗2 ) is just a random draw of P (γ2|γ1) (conditioned on his own
forecast γ1). Since the expected score of any forecast scheme depends only on
the compound distribution of the forecast scheme and Y , the mimicry forecast
γ∗2 will achieve the same expected score as the real γ2 if the compound distri-
bution of (γ2, Y ) and (γ
∗
2 , Y ) are the same. It is straight forward to work out
that the latter condition is equivalent to (14). In brief, if γ1 is sufficient for γ2,
then by appropriate randomisation of γ1, a forecast γ
∗
2 is obtained which has
the same statistical properties as γ2. Note also that in particular γ1 is sufficient
for γ2 if γ2 can be written as a function of γ1.
In Appendix C, it is shown that if γ1 is sufficient for γ2, it holds that
E d(p¯i, pi2) = E d(p¯i, pi1)− E d(pi2, pi1). (15)
5If both γ1 and γ2 are reliable, then condition (14) modifies to γ2 = E
ˆ
γ1|γ2
˜
. In this
situation, γ1 is said to be at least as refined as γ2.
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Keeping in mind that E d(p¯i, pi1) and E d(p¯i, pi2) are the resolution terms of γ1
and γ2, respectively, and that d(. . .) is never negative, Equation (15) demon-
strates that the resolution of γ2 will be at most that of γ1. More generally,
Equations (13) and (15) together allow for the following conclusions as to the
approach of scoring forecasting schemes using strictly proper scores:
• The forecasting scheme piγ achieves the best possible average score among
all forecasts for which γ is sufficient. If the score is strictly proper, piγ
is uniquely defined through this optimum property, in the sense that any
forecast for which γ is sufficient is either equal to piγ or it will have a
worse average score. This can be considered an answer to the conjec-
tured sharpness principle of Gneiting et al. (2005a), reinterpreted in our
framework.
• Per se, it is impossible to say how the score will rank unreliable forecast
schemes, even if one is sufficient for the other. The lack of reliability of
one forecast scheme might be outbalanced by the lack of resolution of the
other.
• It is also not clear how the score will rank forecast schemes (reliable or
unreliable) as long as none of the two forecast schemes is sufficient for the
other. It seems plausible that the actual ranking of such forecasts will
depend on the particular scoring rule employed.
4 Conclusion
The score of a probabilistic forecast was shown to decompose into terms related
to the uncertainty in the observation, the resolution of the forecast, and its reli-
ability, generalising corresponding results for the Brier score. The only property
required of the score is that it be strictly proper. By using a widely accepted
characterisation of reliability, and furthermore by generalising the concepts of
sufficiency and refinement due to DeGroot and Fienberg (1982), it was argued
that both the resolution and the reliability term in the decomposition quantify
forecast attributes for which the case can been made independently (i.e. not
referring to scoring rules). These results provide an epistemological justification
of measuring forecast quality by proper scores. Furthermore, the relation to the
conjectured sharpness principle of Gneiting et al. (2005a) was mentioned.
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Appendix
A An alternative definition of reliability
In this section, it will be shown that any conditional probability is reliable. The
reader is assumed to be familiar with the basic notions of probability theory (see
e.g. Breiman, 1973, chapter 4). Let γ be a probabilistic forecasting scheme which
can be written as a conditional probability, that is
P (Y = k|F) = γk (16)
for all k ∈ E and some sigma algebra F . On both sides of Equation (16), we
take the mathematical expectation conditioned on γ. The right hand side gives
back γk. To compute the left hand side, note that because of Equation (16), γ
is F–measurable. Hence
E [P (Y = k|F) |γ] = E [E [δY,k|F ] |γ]
= E [δY,k|γ]
= P (Y = k|γ) .
(17)
This demonstrates that P (Y = k|γ) = γk, which is the condition for reliability.
B Sufficiency and refinement of DeGroot and
Fienberg
Let γ1, γ2 and pi
1, pi2 as in Section 3. With these definitions, γ1 is sufficient for γ2
if pi2 = E
[
pi1|γ2
]
. It will now be shown that this is equivalent to the sufficiency
condition given by DeGroot and Fienberg (1982), Equation (4.3). To state the
latter condition, I assume that the conditional probability of γ1 given Y and the
conditional probability of γ2 given Y , respectively, have densities g1(p|Y ) and
g2(p|Y ), respectively. Furthermore, the conditional probability of γ2 given γ1 is
assumed to have a density h(γ2|γ1). With these conventions, γ1 is sufficient for
γ2 in the sense of of DeGroot and Fienberg (1982), if
g2(γ2|Y ) =
∫
PE
h(γ2|γ1) g1(γ1|Y ) dγ1. (18)
Multiplying both sides by p¯i and dividing by the density of γ2 we obtain
pi2(γ2) =
∫
PE
pi1(γ1) f(γ1|γ2) dγ1, (19)
with f(γ1|γ2) being the conditional probability of γ1 given γ2. Here we need
to write explicitely that pi1 and pi2 depend on γ1 and γ2, respectively. But the
right hand side of Equation (19) is just E
[
pi1|γ2
]
.
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C Derivation of Equation 15
Still, γ1, γ2 and pi
1, pi2 are as in Section 3. By just applying definitions, we get
d(p¯i, pi2) = s(p¯i, pi2)− s(pi2, pi2)
= s(p¯i, pi2)− s(pi1, pi1)
− (s(pi2, pi2)− s(pi1, pi1)).
(20)
The mathematical expectation of the first term can be written as
E s(p¯i, pi2) = E [E [S(p¯i, Y )|γ2]]
= E [E [S(p¯i, Y )|γ1]]
= E s(p¯i, pi1),
(21)
using elementary properties of the conditional expectation and the fact that p¯i is
not random. Next, the mathematical expectation of the third term is considered:
E s(pi2, pi2) = E
[
s(pi2,E
[
pi1|γ2
]
)
]
= E
[
E
[
s(pi2, pi1)|γ2
]]
= E s(pi2, pi1).
(22)
The first equality is due to sufficiency; the second is valid because pi2 is a
function of γ2, so it can be taken under any expectation conditioned on γ2; and
the third equality uses elementary properties of the conditional expectation.
Taking the expectation over Equation (20) and using Equations (21, 22), we
obtain Equation (15).
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